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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATEOFUTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

BRIAN JAMES RUDOLPH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990534-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) ("pour-over" provision).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Has defendant established plain error or exceptional circumstances to justify
appellate review of his unpreserved challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence?
Because defendant admits that he failed to preserve this issue, this Court should
refuse to address the sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal unless defendant
establishes the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or
exceptional circumstances justifying review. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,7-8 (Utah App.

1996), cert denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Accord Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249,
258 (Utah 1998); State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah App. 1998).
2. Alternatively, to the extent defendant's closing argument preserved a general
challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, does the evidence provide a
reasonable basis for the jury's verdict?
An appellate court assumes that the jury "believed the evidence and inferences
which support the verdict" and upholds the conviction unless the marshaled evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime." State v Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, H 30,
381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App.) (citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah
1997); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,
1156 (Utah 1991)) (quotation marks omitted).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of the following relevant statutes and rules are included in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (aggravated robbery)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17 (Trial Proceedings)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23 (Arrest of Judgment)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24 (Motion for New Trial)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 (Motion for Directed Verdict and
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 (Motion for New Trial)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 23, 1998, an information charged defendant with two counts of
aggravated robbery (R. 2-4). Count I charged defendant with the January 18,1998,
armed robbery of the Travelodge Motel, 524 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, in
which approximately $700 was taken; Count II charged defendant with the January 20,
1998, armed robbery of the Deseret Inn Motel, 50 West 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
in which approximately $850 was taken (id.). Prior to the preliminary hearing, a formal
line-up was conducted at defendant's request which resulted in defendant being identified
as the Deseret Inn robber (R. 23-24;R.156: 93-94).1 Following a preliminary hearing,
defendant was bound over on both counts (R. 26).
Subsequently, the two counts were severed at defendant's request (R. 17). The
case then proceeded to trial on what was originally Count II of the Information, the Desert
Inn aggravated robbery (R. 2-4, 32). Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was
convicted as charged (R. 76-77, 117-119). On March 22, 1999, he was sentenced to the
statutory term of five years-to-life imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentence he
was already serving (R. 124-25).2 After receiving an extension of time in which to file a

1

Mr. Greg Davis, the Deseret Inn motel clerk, positively identified defendant
(R. 156: 93-93). The record does not reflect whether other individuals connected with
either robbery participated in the line-up.
2

Following defendant's sentencing in this case, and his guilty plea in an unrelated
theft case, the State dismissed the Travelodge charge (R. 147-48).

3

notice of appeal, defendant timely appealed (R. 127-33, 135).
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
On January 20,1998, Greg Davis was employed as the front desk clerk for the
Deseret Inn Motel (R.156: 65-66, 69-70). When he began his shift at 4:00 p.m., he
counted the money in the cash drawer; there was $400.00 (R.156: 69, 86). Over the next
two to three hours, he took in approximately $400.00 to $450.00 dollars, resulting in a
total of $800.00 to $850.00 in cash in the motel's cash box (R.156: 85-87, 101).
Around 6:00 p.m., defendant entered the well-lit lobby of the motel (R.156: 69, 7274, 76, 133). Mr. Davis, who was alone, was immediately aware of defendant because
the motel's front door "chimes" when opened (R.156: 70-71). Based on prior experience,
Mr. Davis was "wary" and "somewhat frightened" when defendant approached with both
his hands in his front pockets (R.156: 75). For this reason, Mr. Davis continually
watched defendant as he walked across the lobby (R.156: 70-71,74, 94-95).
Defendant stopped very close to the counter, leaving only two and one-half to
three feet between himself and Mr. Davis (R.156: 70-71). Defendant's face was
uncovered (R.156: 74). Mr. Davis, who was wearing his glasses which gave him 20/20
vision, had a "good view" of defendant; Mr. Davis was undistracted as he observed

3

Except as otherwise noted, the facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict." Chaney, 1999 Utah. Ct. App. 309,130, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citing
Brown, 948 P.2d at 343). The trial transcripts are externally numbered as R.156 and R.
157. Internal pages of each volume are designated as (R.156: 3).
4

defendant's face, hair length, hair color, height, weight, skin color, age, and clothing,
which consisted of a long gray sweater and baggy blue pants (R.156: 74-75, 89). Mr.
Davis observed a plain metal hoop earring in each of defendant's ears (R.156: 129-31).
Defendant also smelled strongly of what Mr. Davis assumed was "hair gel" since
defendant's hair was "moussed and spiked" (R.156: 91).
Defendant asked the price of a room and Mr. Davis responded (R. 156: 76).
Defendant said that the price sounded "good"(R.156: 77). Mr. Davis waited a moment to
see if defendant was going to request a room (id.). Defendant instead "pulled a gun out of
his right front pants pocket and said, "why don't you give me, you know, the money in
the till" (id.). Defendant repeated, "give me the money, give me the money" (R.156: 80).
Mr. Davis's "first impulse was to reach for the gun" which was held by defendant in his
right hand, slightly above his waist line, pointing generally in Mr. Davis's direction
(R.156: 78-79). Mr. Davis decided "no, this is serious, I could get hurt" and moved
quickly to the cash drawer which was five feet to his right (R.156: 80). Mr. Davis
removed the wooden cash box and placed it on the counter in front of defendant (R.156:
80-81). As soon as defendant reached into the box to remove the cash, Mr. Davis moved
back into a small room directly behind the counter and locked the door to avoid being
shot (R.156: 81-83). Mr. Davis stayed in the room until he heard the lobby door chime
again, indicating defendant had left (R.156: 83-84).
Just as Mr. Davis came out of the room, Leonard McCann, a customer, walked into

5

the lobby (R.156: 84). Mr. McCann had been in his car in the motel's carport area in
front of the glass wall of the lobby (R.156: 104). Believing the man at the counter was
just registering, Mr. McCann waited outside and only walked in as the man exited (id.)
Mr. McCann noticed that the man was about his same height with a medium build (id.).
Mr. Davis told Mr. McCann he had been robbed (R.156: 105). Within "30 seconds," Mr.
McCann went back outside to see if he could determine where the robber went (R.156:
106-07). About 150 feet from the motel, Mr. McCann saw
this individual going down the street. He was moving at a - he wasn't
running and he wasn't walking, he was just going pretty fast. And he
looked like he didn't know where he wanted to go. He kinda looked out at
the street and out at the other direction like he was trying to decide where
he wanted to go.
(R.156: 106-07). Mr. McCann made "mental notes" of what the man was wearing,
knowing that he would be asked to later identify him (R.156: 113). The man wore a
white shirt, which Mr. McCann thought might be a turtleneck since so much of it showed
above the wide collar of the man's gray loose fitting sweater; the man also wore baggy
pants of a brighter blue color than traditional dark levis (R.156: 108-13). The man
appeared headed for the Hilton Hotel, which was about a block west of the Deseret Inn
(R.156: 107,116-17).
After receiving the report of the robbery and a description of the suspect, the
police began canvassing the area around the Hilton Hotel (R.156: 115-17,119). Two
plain-clothed detectives went into the Hilton, where they observed defendant at a public
6

telephone in the lobby area, about seventy feet from the hotel's restaurant Annabelle's
(R.156: 119-20, 124-25, 149-50). Even though defendant did not have on a gray sweater
and had on glasses, he otherwise matched the description of the robber in that
he was wearing a white shirt, his hair was, appeared to be wet like he had
just wet it down and dried it with a towel, kinda sticking up and kind of in a
spiked look, wearing levi's, had the earrings.
(R.156: 121-23). The police stopped defendant for questioning (R.156: 125). Defendant
told one officer that he was meeting a male friend, Ed Bernard (R.156: 125). A few
minutes later, he told a different officer that he had was meeting his girlfriend, Melanie
Swallow, for dinner (R.156: 150-51).
As the officers detained defendant in a small glassed-in business office inside the
hotel, Angela Dent, an Annabelle's employee, walked past (R.156: 166). She
immediately and spontaneously recognized defendant as having been in the restaurant
twenty minutes before (R.156: 165-67).4 Ms. Dent said defendant entered the restaurant
wearing a gray sweater (R.156: 165). Because the restaurant was crowded and seating
was limited, Ms. Dent asked defendant if there was "only one in his party,"and he replied
"yes" (R.156: 163). About ten minutes after she seated him, Ms. Dent returned to the
table to make sure defendant had been served (R.156: 164). Defendant was gone but the

4

A year later at trial, Ms. Dent could not "definitely" identify the person who had
entered the restaurant; however, she maintained that the man detained by the police was
the same man who entered the restaurant (R.156: 163, 165-65). It is undisputed that
defendant was the person Ms. Dent saw with the police.

7

gray sweater was left at the table (R.156: 165). Ms. Dent turned the sweater over to the
police (R.157: 165; Exhibit 11).
Despite Ms. Dent's identification, defendant insisted that he had not been in the
restaurant and that the gray sweater was not his (R.156: 126). He claimed to have no coat
even though it was a cold winter night (R.156: 125-26; R.157: 175).
The police brought the clerk, Greg Davis, from the Deseret Inn to the Hilton to see
if he could identify defendant (R.156: 90). Defendant was still in the glassed-in hotel
business office with some officers (R. 156: 90, 98-99).5 Viewing defendant through the
glass wall of the office, Mr. Davis said he was not "100 per cent" certain if defendant was ~
the robber:
[Defendant] didn't have the sweater on. His hair, when he robbed me, had
been moussed and spiked. His hair, when I saw him at the Hilton, had been
smoothed down. He did not have glasses on when I saw him. At the Hilton
he had glasses on.

,;

(R.156: 91). Mr. Davis believed, however, that all of defendant's other features and
characteristics were consistent with the robber's, including his height, weight, sex, age,
color of skin, length of hair, and color of hair (R.156: 89, 92-93. At trial, Mr. Davis also
testified that defendant's clothing, including his earrings, pants, and the gray sweater

5

Because defendant never challenged the circumstances surrounding the show-up,
it is unclear if defendant was with the plain-clothed officers who had originally detained
him (R.156: 119, 125, 149-50, 152-53), or whether other uniformed officers or hotel
security officers were in the room during the show-up (R.156: 135, 152-53, 166,169-70).
In any case, no one described defendant as under arrest or physically handcuffed.
8

retrieved by Ms. Dent, were consistent with the robber's (R.156. 89, 129-30; Exhibits 11,
13&15). 6
Mr. McCann agreed that the gray sweater found in the restaurant and defendant's
blue baggy pants were consistent in color and shape with the clothing of the man he saw
walking away from the Deseret Inn immediately after the robbery (R.156: 109-112;
Exhibits 11,12 & 13). Additionally, an officer near defendant, inside the hotel business

6

Defendant claims that Mr. Davis was only "50 percent sure" that defendant was
the robber because of the three changes noted and also because defendant did not smell of
"cologne" and wore "different" earrings; defendant characterizes Mr. Davis's
identification as "tentative"and "weak" and claims that Mr. Davis "failed to identify"
defendant {see Brief of Appellant [Br. App.] at 7, 11, 22,24). This is not a correct,
marshaled recitation of the facts.
Mr. Davis testified he was less than "100 percent" certain at the show-up because
of the change in clothing and hairstyle and the addition of the glasses (R.156: 91-92, 99100). A police report stated that Mr. Davis was "50% sure" in the show-up that defendant
was the robber (R.156: 174). Mr. Davis explained that when pressed by the police to give
some percentage of certainty during the show-up, he may have said 50 or 70 percent but
knew that he just "wasn't 100 percent" certain (R.156: 92-93, 99-100). He stated that he
positively identified defendant in a subsequent line-up (R.156: 93-94), and had "no
doubt" at trial that defendant was the person who had robbed him (R.156: 94). All of this
testimony was admitted without objection.
When defense counsel asked Mr. Davis whether defendant smelled of cologne
when he viewed him at the Hilton, Mr. Davis responded that they were separated by a
glass partition (R.156: 99). While the police report, referred to above, stated that
defendant did not smell of cologne at the Hilton (R. 157:174), a different officer testified
that defendant's hair was wet (R.156: 91,170-71, 173, 195-96, 202-04), a fact, which if
true, would account for the lack of hair gel smell. Mr. Davis further testified that the
metal hoop earrings removed from defendant were "consistent" with those he observed
during the robbery, even though he remembered the earrings as being plain and possibly
"slightly larger" (R.156: 129-30; Exhibit 15).
As will be discussed, these differences went to the weight of the evidence and not
its admissibility.

9

office, described defendant's hair as "semi-wet," as if it had been recently wetted, pushed
back and was now drying (R.157: 170).7
That same evening, a hotel housekeeper emptied the trash from the public
restroom directly across from Annabelle's Restaurant and closest to the telephone where
defendant was arrested (R.156: 123-25,142-43). The housekeeper found a Crossman BB
gun hidden underneath a plastic garbage bag (R.156: 143-46, 151; Exhibit 14). Mr. Davis
stated that the gun appeared to be the same as the one used in the robbery (R.156: 77-78;
Exhibit 14).
When defendant was booked into jail, $850.00 in cash was found hidden inside his
shoes (R.156: 137-38). This was the same amount of cash estimated to have been taken
during the robbery (R. 156: 86).
The jury convicted defendant of aggravated robbery (R. 117).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant did not request a RamireT* hearing to challenge the pre-trial
identifications by Mr. Davis, Ms. Dent, or Mr. McCann. Nor did defendant object to the

7

The prosecutor argued that defendant's wet hair supported the inference that he
had attempted to wash or rinse it after the robbery (R.157: 202-04). Defense counsel
agreed that the evidence supported the inference that defendant may have changed his
hairstyle but then argued, based on Mr. Davis's identification at the Hilton, that
defendant's hair was just "different" than the robber's (R.157: 195-96).
8

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (defense may request a pre-trial
determination of the constitutional admissibility of an eyewitness identification).

10

Mr. Davis's in-court identification of defendant and his clothing, or the in-court
identifications of the clothing by Ms. Dent and Mr. McCann. Similarly, defendant did not
move for a dismissal, an arrest of judgment, or a new trial on the grounds of insufficient
evidence. Despite these omissions, defendant claims that he may challenge the legal
sufficiency of the evidence, that is, the sufficiency of Mr. Davis's identification of
defendant, for the first time on appeal because the sufficiency of the evidence is of "such
vital importance" in a criminal case, that a criminal defendant need not abide by normal
preservation rules. In the alternative, defendant claims that this Court should consider his
claim under the "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" exceptions to the
preservation requirement.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah appellate courts, the majority of state
courts, and the federal courts recognize only three exceptions to the preservation
requirement. An appellate court will review an unpreserved issue, even a constitutional
one, for the first time on appeal, only if the defendant establishes the ineffectiveness of
his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or exceptional circumstances justifying
review. Defendant's attempts to craft a fourth exception to the preservation requirement
- an exception which would apply in virtually every criminal case - is reminiscent of the ~
disavowed Breckenridge9 "liberty interest" standard. More importantly, a fourth
exception to the preservation requirement is unnecessary. Utah appellate courts, in line
9

State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983).
11

with the majority view, already recognize that where the prosecution wholly fails to
establish a requisite element, the established exceptions of ineffective counsel, plain error,
or exceptional circumstances will justify reversal.
In this case, allowing defendant to challenge the legal sufficiency of the

,

identification evidence for the first time on appeal would also smack of "invited error."
'17.

Despite the obvious availability of the established exception of ineffective counsel,
defendant has chosen not to allege his counsel's ineffectiveness on appeal. The reason
for that choice is apparent: the record establishes that trial counsel's decision not to
challenge the legal sufficiency of Mr. Davis's identification was a conscious, strategic
choice. Trial counsel, who is also defendant's appellate counsel, needed the
discrepancies noted by Mr. Davis during the Hilton Hotel show-up to argue that those
"differences" undermined the weight the jury should give to the remaining evidence.
Indeed, trial counsel argued below that Mr. Davis's show-up identification was the
"freshest" identification and, therefore, the "most likely to be accurate" (R.157: 190-91).
Yet, on appeal, counsel now argues that the show-up identification was inherently
•
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unreliable because it was unduly suggestive (Br. App. at 11,24-26). It is this type of
change in position - a change which unfairly prevents full development of the issue
below - that is one of the dangers the preservation requirement was created to avoid.
For much the same reason, the trial court had no reason to sua sponte question the
reliability and, therefore, admissibility, of Mr. Davis's identification of defendant. And
12

based on Mr. Davis's identification of defendant, the other identifications of defendant's
clothing, and the remaining circumstantial evidence, the trial court had no reason to sua
sponte question the legal sufficiency of prosecution's evidence, or ultimately, the jury's
verdict. In sum, defendant has failed to establish plain error or exceptional circumstances
to justify his failure to preserve his legal sufficiency argument.
Alternatively, to the extent that defendant claims his general defense against the
charges preserved his current sufficiency challenge, the issue is limited. Defendant's
failure to move for dismissal constitutes an implicit admission that the prosecution
evidence was legally sufficient for submission to the jury, i.e., that the prosecution had
established a prima facie case from which a jury could convict defendant. If a jury could
legally convict defendant, the only issue possibly remaining is one of fact: whether a
reasonable jury would convict defendant. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly provided
the jury with a reasonable basis to convict defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH PLAIN ERROR OR
MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT
TO THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE;
THEREFORE, HE IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THIS ISSUE
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
A. There is No Legal or Policy Justification for Creating a New Exception to the
Preservation Requirement.
Utah appellate courts have long followed the established rule that issues, including
13
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constitutional issues, which have not been preserved in the lower courts by specific
objection, will not be considered for the first time on appeal unless the appellant
establishes the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or
exceptional circumstances to justify their review. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah
App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Accord Julian v. State, 966 P.2d
249,258 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994)); State v.
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,965 (Utah App. 1998). Under these limited exceptions, an
appellant must establish that his trial counsel's performance was prejudicially defective,
the trial court committed obvious prejudicial error, or that such "exceptional or unusual
circumstances" exist such that it would be "manifestly unjust" not to review the
unpreserved issue. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-9
(Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,923 (Utah App. 1991); and State v.
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)).10
Defendant claims that a fourth exception to the preservation requirement exists: a
10

As noted in Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 n.5, the use of the term "manifest injustice"
can be misleading. "Manifest injustice" is sometimes used to define "exceptional
circumstances," in the sense of those truly exceptional cases involving "rare procedural
anomalies." See e.g. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209; State v. Kazda, 545
P.2d 190,193 (Utah 1976). But the term more commonly equates to plain error. State v.
Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309,154, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App.); State v.
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1226 (Utah 1998); State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1061 (Utah
1991); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1206 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Cobo, 60 P.2d
952, 958-59 (Utah 1936). In fact, numerous jurisdictions refer to plain error as
"fundamental error." 3 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure §
26.5(d), at 255 n.71 (1984).
14

criminal defendant need not move for dismissal, for arrest of judgment, for new trial or
otherwise preserve a sufficiency claim because a defendant has the "fundamental right"
not to be convicted based on insufficient evidence. While the latter is true, defendant's
assertion that a fourth exception exists is specious and against the weight of Utah, other
state, and federal authority. Moreover, a fourth exception is unnecessary under the
current standard. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926 (recognizing that existing exceptions to
preservation rule are "sufficiently broad to encompass any situation requiring Utah's
appellate courts to consider a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal in the
interest ofjustice").
Defendant begins with the axiom that a criminal conviction based on legally
insufficient evidence is unconstitutional. Compare Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
317-24 (1979) (federal court may reverse state court decision on habeas review if it finds
that "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;"
citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), for requirement of proof of all elements
beyond a reasonable doubt), with Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1992) ( a
Jackson-type review only determines if there is an "independent constitutional violation
of Winship; it does not focus on whether the trier of fact made the "correct guilt or
innocence determination"). From this, defendant improperly conjectures that a criminal
defendant need not preserve a legal sufficiency claim in the same way he or she is
required to preserve all other constitutional claims.

15
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A handful ofjurisdictions do exempt sufficiency claims from their normal
preservation requirements through statute or rule.11 However, the majority of
jurisdictions recognize that:
[t]o entitle an appellant in either a civil or criminal case to urge [on appeal]
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, he must,
at the close of all the evidence, have interposed in the trial court a motion
either for a directed verdict in a civil case or for judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case. By this procedure the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence becomes a question of law which the court will consider on
appeal. It is well settled that absent such motion [the appellate court] will
not review the evidence. Appellant may not for the first time on appeal
raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is equally well
settled that an appellant who interposes a motion for a directed verdict at
the close of plaintiff s evidence in a civil case, or a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government's evidence in a criminal case, who
thereafter introduces testimony in his defense, thereby waives his motion
unless he renews it at the close of the evidence.
McDonough v. United States, 248 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1957). In other words,
Upon the trial of a jury case, in order to preserve for review the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence, a party who believes that he is entitled to a
verdict as a matter of law must, at the close of all the evidence, make a
11

See e.g. State v. Granby, 939 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Mont. 1997) (recognizing
preservation requirement followed in federal courts but concluding that Montana statute
permits a sufficiency claim to be raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Green, 691
So.2d 1273, 1275-76 (La. App. 1997) (Louisiana criminal procedure rule permits a
sufficiency claim to be raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Ashley, 889 P.2d 723,
724-25 (Idaho App. 1995) (Idaho civil procedure rule permitting a sufficiency claim to be
raised for the first time on appeal also applies to criminal cases). See also North Carolina
Code § 15A- 1446(d)(5) (exempting legal sufficiency claims from preservation
requirements); Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1124(A)(7) (sufficiency
claim may be raised for the first time on appeal).
Without noting the limited scope of these cases, defendant improperly cites them
in support of his constitutional argument. See Br. App. at 13-14 n.4.
16

motion for a directed verdict in his favor and secure a ruling thereon from
the trial court.
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d
250,256 (10th Cir. 1994) (failure to move for judgment of acquittal precludes review of
sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal but appellate court may sua sponte review
for plain error or "manifest miscarriage ofjustice"); United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d
501, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (failure to preserve sufficiency claim through
motion for acquittal waives appellate review but court may review for plain error or to
"avoid a manifest miscarriage ofjustice"); United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 773
(3rd Cir.) (federal criminal procedural rules preclude appellate review of unpreserved
sufficiency claims; only exceptions are plain error and manifest injustice), cert denied,
490 U.S. 1113 (1989); Long v. Smith, 663 F.2d 18,21 (6th Cir. 1981) (state supreme court
correctly ruled that sufficiency claim was waived where defendant failed to move for a
directed verdict; however, claim of error injury instruction could be reviewed for plain
error), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1024 (1982); United States v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1081, 1082
(5th Cir. 1973) (where defendant fails to move for a directed verdict, sufficiency claim is
not preserved for appeal absent a "manifest miscarriage ofjustice'9); Hall v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 959 Utah 109, 111 n.l (Utah 1998) (normally failure to move for directed
verdict precludes appellate review) (citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14,15 n.l (Utah
1988)). Cf. Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,255-56 (Utah App.)
(unlike jury trials, rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require preservation of
17
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sufficiency issues when the "action is tried without a jury"), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449
(Utah 1997). See also State v. Moriarty, 914 S.W.2d 416,421-22 (Mo. App. 1996) (plain
error justified review of unpreserved claim of fundamental instructional error); State v.
Puaoi, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (Hawai'i 1995) (absence of material element constitutes plain
error justifying appellate review); State v. Jannamon, 819 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Ariz. App.
1991) (court will review unpreserved sufficiency claim for "fundamental error" where
there was no evidence to support crime charged); Casadas v. People, 304 P.2d 626, 627

-r

(Colo. 1956) (en banc) (unpreserved claim of insufficiency was reviewed on appeal
because of "total failure" of proof which amounted to "patent" error).12
While no Utah case has explicitly discussed this preservation requirement in the
context of a criminal sufficiency claim, the Utah criminal procedure rules governing
dismissals, directed verdicts, and new trials contain essentially the same language as that
found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Compare Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o), 23 & 24, with Utah R. Civ. P. 50 & 59, and with Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29. (Copies of the rules are attached in Addendum A). Indeed, no Utah case
has recognized any difference between the preservation requirements for a criminal as
12

In citing to these other state cases, defendant claims that their discussion of
"fundamental error" amounts to a recognition of a fourth exception to the normal
preservation requirement distinct and separate from the existing exceptions of ineffective
counsel, plain error or unusual circumstances (Br. App. at 12-18). This is not correct.
Universally, "fundamental error"is treated as simply another expression of plain error or
exceptional circumstances. See discussion in footnote 10, supra, at 14.
18

,-

opposed to civil case. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7-11; Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922-26.
Nor should there be any difference in the preservation requirements for civil and
criminal cases because the rationales behind the "raise-or-waive" rule apply equally to
both. Those rationales include the recognition:
"that [the preservation rule] is a necessary corollary of our adversary system
in which issues are framed by the litigants and presented to a court; that
fairness to all parties requires a litigant to advance his contentions at a time
when there is an opportunity to respond to them factually, if his opponent
chooses to; that the rule promotes efficient trial proceedings; that reversing
for error not preserved permits the losing side to second guess its tactical
decisions after they do not produce the desired result; and that there is
something unseemly about telling a lower court it was wrong when it never
was presented with the opportunity to be right. The principal rationale,
however, is judicial economy. There are two components to judicial
economy: (1) if the losing side can obtain an appellate reversal because of
error not objected to, the parties and public are put to the expense of retrial
that could have been avoided has an objection been made; and (2) if an
issue had been raised in the trial court, it could have been resolved there,
and the parties and public could be spared the expense of an appeal."
3 Wayne R. LaFave and Jeroid H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 26.5(c), at 251-52 (1984)
(quoting State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (Or. App. 1979)).13
Turning to the specifics of defendant's claim, defendant asserts that he should be
able to challenge the sufficiency of the identification evidence for the first time on appeal
13

Similar concerns were recognized by this Court in rejecting the overly broad
concept of "liberty interest" as a new exception to the preservation rule in criminal cases.
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (acceptance of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)
"liberty interest" as a separate exception to the preservation requirement would erode
requirement that parties carry the burden of their own arguments); Archambeau, 820 P.2d
at 925 {Breckenridge "liberty interest" doctrine would permit exception to "swallow the
general rule" of preservation in criminal cases).
19
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despite his failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence below. While
defendant admits he did not move for dismissal, directed verdict, or new trial, he does not
acknowledge his other significant omissions: he did not move for a State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), hearing to test the reliability of the pre-trial identifications and he
did not object to any in-court identification of defendant or his clothing. These omissions
are significant because defendant's argument is not that the prosecution evidence, if
believed, is insufficient for conviction. Instead, his argument is that the evidence is
necessarily insufficient because its "foundation" - Mr. Davis's identification of
defendant - is the unreliable result of impermissible suggestion. See e.g. Br. App. at 11
("show-up was highly suggestive . . . Mr. Davis' subsequent identifications are not
persuasive because he had been exposed to Mr. Rudolph at the show-up"); at 17
("whether the State had presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Rudolph was the assailant
despite the lack of positive identification"); at 22 (Mr. Davis' show-up identification is
the "foundation of the State's entire case . . . [i]f that foundation was faulty, the State's
case, like a building, collapses"). See also Br. App. at 24-26 (discussing various
Ramirez-type factors of why show-up and subsequent identifications should be
disregarded). Because defendant failed to challenge the legal reliability - and therefore
admissibility - of any identification below, he is precluded from doing so for the first
time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113
(failure to object to photo array or in-court identification at trial precluded appellate
20

review of due process claim); State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (failure to
object to eyewitness identification on constitutional grounds when the trial court admitted
the evidence precluded appellate review); State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983)
(failure to object to line-up and photo array evidence at trial precluded review on appeal);
State v. Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah 1980) (failure to object to in-court
identification waives issue on appeal).
B. Defendant Has Failed to Establish Plain Error.
Relying on the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant claims that the trial
court "obviously" erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss, arrest judgment, or grant a new
trial based on insufficient evidence (Br. App. at 18-19).14 Again, while defendant's initial
proposition is true - a court may sua sponte dismiss, arrest judgment, or grant a new trial
for insufficient evidence - his conclusion is not.
Rules 17(o), 23 and 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permit a trial court to
sua sponte dismiss an information, arrest judgment, or grant a new trial if the trial court
is convinced that the evidence is legally insufficient. But the criminal rules provide no
greater power to a trial court judge in a criminal case than do the civil procedure rules in a
civil case. In both cases, the court's power to act independently from counsel does not
14

A party claiming plain error must establish that: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, [the appellate court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined."
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
21

negate a party's concurrent obligation to preserve issues that the party wishes to raise on
appeal. See cases discussed, supra, at 16-18.
Furthermore, a court cannot be faulted for allowing a case to go to the jury, or
allowing a subsequent jury verdict to stand, when the prosecution has established at least
"some evidence" to support each element of the crimefromwhich a reasonable jury could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For under these circumstances, it is the exclusive
province of the jury to determine the weight to be accorded that evidence. Chaney, 1999
Utah Ct. App. 309, % 30, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15.
Here, defendant does not claim that there is no evidence to support each element of
the crime (R.157: 200-01). Instead, he asserts that the jury should not have accorded the
identification evidence full weight (Br. App. at 22-26). But weight is uniquely a jury

•

function. Chaney, id. Thus, even under defendant's reading of the facts, a dismissal,
arrest of judgment, or new trial here would constitute an impermissible invasion of the
province of the jury.15
15

Even in the cases cited by defendant which considered an unpreserved
sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal, no court reversed where there was some
evidence presented to support each element. See e.g. State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42,46-47
(Conn. 1993) (finding conflicted circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain verdict);
Smith v. State, 213 A.2d 861 (Del. 1965) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain
conviction, especially in light of unreasonableness of defendant's theory). Only where
there was no evidence to support a requisite element was reversal warranted under either a
plain error or "manifest injustice" concept. See e.g. Santistevan, 39 F.3d at 256-57 (plain
error and exceptional circumstances justified sua sponte reversal where there was no
evidence of material element); Pauoi, 891 P.2d at 278 (plain error justified reversal where
there was no evidence of material element even though issue was not preserved);
22

The trial court also had no obligation to sua sponte question the admissibility of
the eyewitness identification when defendant did not move for a Ramirez hearing and did
not object to the admission of the various identifications during trial. Cf. Lopez, 886 P.2d
at 1113 (finding no plain error or exceptional circumstances to justify review of
unpreserved challenge to eyewitness identification); Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335 (applying
"raise or waive" rule to eyewitness identification evidence). Compare State v. Nelson,
950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1997) (trial judge commits error if he or she fails to make
Ramirez findings when requested).
It was apparent that defense counsel was fully aware of the eyewitness issue but
strategically chose to forego any objections to Mr. Davis's show-up identification so that
he could use the discrepancies noted by Mr. Davis to bolster the defense. Counsel, an
experienced legal defender, requested a line-up prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 2324). This record contains no details of that line-up, other than its result: Mr. Davis
positively identified defendant (R.156: 93-94). Additionally, prior to trial, counsel
submitted a complete "Long"16 cautionary jury instruction, as did the State, which
instructions were ultimately given by the court (R. 48-50, 73-75, 99-101). Both these

Jannamon, 819 P.2d at 1025-26 (fundamental error to allow child sex abuse conviction
to stand where no proof of victim's age even though defendant did not contest the issue
below).
16

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,492 (Utah 1986) (requiring a cautionary
eyewitness jury instruction when requested by the defense).

23

(

actions evidence trial counsel's understanding of the legal aspects underlying eyewitness
identification.
Counsel's cross-examination also demonstrated his understanding of the factual
aspects of eyewitness testimony. The defense focused on the discrepancies noted by Mr.
Davis during the show-up identification at the Hilton (R.156: 98-100). Contrary to
defendant's current claim that the show-up was a product of "undue suggestion" (Br.
App. at 24-25), the defense argued below that Mr. Davis's show-up identification was the
"freshest" identification and, therefore, "the most likely to be accurate" (R.157: 190). By
arguing that the show-up identification was the most reliable, the defense was able to use
the differences in defendant's appearance noted by Mr. Davis to cast doubt on the overall
evidence. The fact that the jury rejected this argument does not undercut its theoretical
validity. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 716-18 (Utah App. 1997) (defense counsel may
strategically choose to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, citing State v. Bullock,
791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998).
Therefore, for the trial court to have sua sponte excluded the show-up evidence
would have fundamentally interfered with defendant's trial strategy, a strategy that
defendant is bound by on appeal absent a claim of ineffective counsel. See e.g. Irwin,
924 P.2d at 11 (cautioning against use of exceptions as a way to address the effectiveness
of counsel even though no ineffectiveness is alleged or established); Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1220 ("a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led
24

the trial court into committing the error'9); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205-06 ("where invited
error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails").17
In sum, the trial court had no basis to believe it was committing error in allowing
defense counsel to follow-through with what appeared to be a legitimate choice of
strategy. Neither counsel's failure to object nor the evidence itself provided a basis from
which the court should have sua sponte questioned the admissibility of the evidence.
C. Defendant Has Failed to Establish Exceptional Circumstances.
If defendant were correct that no evidence pointed to him as the Deseret Inn
robber, then his conviction would indeed have to be reversed to avoid manifest injustice.1
However, even defendant does not contend that there is no evidence to support his
identification, only that the show-up identification was so inherently suggestive that any
subsequent identifications must also be necessarily viewed as unreliable (Br. App. at 25).
On this basis defendant claims exceptional circumstances.
Because defendant did not raise the reliability issue below, the record does not

17

In making this argument, the State does not mean to suggest that any error
occurred; only that to the extent defendant claims any error on appeal, his actions and
defense lead the trial court into committing it.
18

"With the possible exception of an aberration or two, 'exceptional
circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional
situations, for cases - as our Supreme Court has recently recognized - involving 'rare
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3). See
also discussion footnote 10, supra, at 14.
25
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contain full details surrounding the various identifications of defendant by Mr. Davis.19
The record does establish that the show-up occurred within one hour of the robbery,
presumptively to ensure that a basis for arrest existed despite defendant's denials and
conflicting statements (R.156: 90,99,133-35). While defendant was in a business office
with at least some police officers, it is unclear how many officers were there or if they
were uniformed (R.156: 119,125,135,149-50, 152-53,166,169-70). Defendant
apparently was not handcuffed. Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 (during show-up,
suspect was handcuffed to fence, illuminated by headlights, and surrounded by uniformed
officers); State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225,229 (Utah App. 1998) (same).
Despite defendant's current claims of suggestiveness, it appears that Mr. Davis
was especially observant and unwilling to positively identify defendant given the
accessory (sweater and glasses) and hairstyle discrepancies. While any single-person
show-up is more inherently suggestive than a multiple-person line-up, State v. Bruce, 779
P.2d 646, 651 (Utah 1989), nothing in this record indicates that this show-up was unduly
suggestive.
Nor does Mr. Davis's "less than 100 percent certain" identification nullify his
subsequent positive identifications. It is, instead, simply a factor to be considered by the
jury in determining what weight to accord the ultimate identification. State v. Baker, 963

19

This lack of a fully developed record is one of the dangers the preservation rule
seeks to avoid. See discussion of rationales behind rule, supra, at 19.
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P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); Rivera, 954 P.2d at
228; Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1112; State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1983). This is
especially true where Mr. Davis's description of the robber has remained consistent and
he has never identified anyone other than defendant as the robber. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
783.
In sum, defendant has failed to establish any reason for this Court to believe that
his conviction is legally insufficient or otherwise lacks reliable support.
* * *

Because defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence and has established no exception to the preservation requirement, this Court
should not consider the merits of his claim for the first time on appeal.
POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANT'S GENERAL
DEFENSE PRESERVED A CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY
OF THE EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE PROVIDES A
REASONABLE BASIS TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
In addition to defendant's first argument that (1) no preservation is required for a
sufficiency claim in a criminal case, and (2) plain error and exceptional circumstances
justify review in this case (see Point I of both parties's briefs), defendant also claims that
by merely defending against the criminal charge he has preserved his current sufficiency
challenge (Br. App. at 17 & 22-26). This is incorrect. To the extent defendant's general
defense may have preserved any challenge, it is merely a limited challenge to the
27

reasonableness of the jury's verdict.
Defendant's defense was predicted on Mr. Davis's show-up identification. But
unlike his current claim of suggestiveness, at trial defendant argued that the jury should
accept the reliability of Mr. Davis's identification:
So what we want to look at is identification was made within an hour
after the robbery. That's when it's freshest in [Mr. Davis's] mind, when
he's most likely to make an accurate identification. And at that point he
said he was only 50 percent sure. Why is he 50 percent sure? Because my
client is pretty average. He's pretty average. Average height, average hair
color, average build. The robber, I think Ms. Dent put it best, would be like
the boy next door. That's the problem with this case, we have an average
person who goes in there and robs a store.
(R. 157: 190). According to the defense, the discrepancies Mr. Davis observed at the
Hilton were not simply changes in defendant's appearances but actual "differences"
between defendant and the robber (R.157: 191-96). In addition, the circumstantial
evidence was merely a series of coincidences:
. . . I'll tell you what happened in this case. We have an average looking
individual, young man, short brown hair, average build, average height,
goes in the Deseret Inn. He holds the place up. He takes the cash, he runs
down probably to the Hilton Hotel, even though we don't know that for
sure, because no one saw him go in there. He goes in the Hilton Hotel, goes
down, sits in the restaurant. He's sitting there. While he's sitting there he
sees some commotion because another individual is being arrested. He
goes, un-oh. First of all, he thinks he's gotten away with it, he thinks he's
okay. So he goes to the hotel; he sits down. Now he sees some commotion
going on.
Now remember what happens is that there was police responding
really quickly. If they get a call they are at the Hilton Hotel within five
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minutes.20 So they come in, they arrest this individual. He is sitting there.
He sees this happening, although now the police are nearer in the hotel. I'm
in trouble, so he ditches the sweater. He goes across to the restroom, he
ditches the gun there, then he splits out while they have my client in
custody.
My client is down there to meet his girlfriend and his friend, he's
planning to have a good night out. There is a restaurant there, there is The
Bay, is nearby, there's other bars around. And he brings his money. And
as I've done on occasion, when I'm worried about being robbed, he put his
money in his shoe
You are going to go out at night, you are going to
bring a lot of money with you. He is an average build, he is out in the
lobby, he is on the phone, the police come up and grab him. That's what
happened in this case.
(R.157: 200-01). The defense also used the police report's reference to Mr. Davis being
"50 percent sure" during the show-up to argue that it was "not enough for the state to
even [the scales], to make it 50 percent that he's guilty . . . you have to tip the scale all the
way to beyond a reasonable doubt" before the jury could convict (R. 157: 199). (A copy
of defendant's entire closing argument is attached in Addendum B.)
This general defense does not preserve the more specific identification challenge
which defendant raises on appeal. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113-14 (failure to raise a
constitutional challenge to a line-up and photo array waives the issue on appeal); OIsen9
860 P.2d at 334 (failure to challenge eyewitness identifications on constitutional grounds
waived the issue for purposes of appeal); Larocco, 665 P.2d at 1272-73 (refusing to

20

The police did not testify that they arrived at the Hilton five minutes after the
robbery. One officer was dispatched at 6:25 p.m. to the Deseret Inn and arrived there
about five minutes later; he then questioned Mr. Davis for about fifteen to twenty minutes
before the two went to the Hilton (R.156: 133-34).
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consider for the first time on appeal a claim of insufficient evidence predicated on a claim
of a tainted line-up and photo spread); Wilson, 608 P.2d at 1239 (recognizing that failure
to challenge an in-court identification waives the issue for purposes of appeal, but then
finding no suggestiveness in identification); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908, 909-10
(Utah 1978) (defendant cannot raise for the first time on appeal factual discrepancies in
the evidence that he did not raise at trial).
Moreover, defendant's jury argument effectively conceded that the jury could
convict defendant; the argument just pointed why, in defendant's opinion, a reasonable

'

jury would not. In essence, defendant made this same concession by failing to move for
dismissal or a directed verdict. See McDonough, 248 F.2d at 727 (where no motion for
acquittal is made at the end of the government's case, appellate court assumes evidence
was sufficient to support verdict). Cf. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 523 (Utah 1983)
("[i]f the State's evidence at the close of its case in chief does not establish a prima facie
case against defendant, the Court must, as required by [Utah R. Crim. P.] Rule 17(o),
dismiss the charge"). Having implicitly conceded the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
the only argument colorably preserved by defendant's general defense is one of fact:
would a reasonable juror have convicted him? That is, given the jury's prerogative to
access the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence, does the
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evidence provide a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict?21
The following evidence establishes a basis for the jury verdict of guilt.22
Defendant did not contest that:
1. On January 20, 1998, the Deseret Inn was robbed of $800 to $850.00.
2. The robber used a gun similar in appearance to a Crossman BB gun.
3. The robber was a young male who wore baggy blue pants, a gray oversized
sweater, a white shirt underneath, and two metal hoop earrings, one in each ear.

21

In general terms, this is the same assessment made when a sufficiency challenge
is preserved. That is, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, is
the evidence:
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
Baker, 963 P.2d at 809. Accord State v. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, % 30, 381
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)); State v.
Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah
1991)).
But a defendant should not be allowed to avoid normal preservation requirements
by cloaking an unpreserved legal claim, here the identification's inherent unreliability,
within the general mantle of sufficiency. Accord Larocco, 665 P.2d at 1272 (where
defendant failed to object to line-ups or photo arrays below, he could not raise this issue
as a sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal); Wilson, 608 P.2d at 1239 (rejecting
sufficiency argument predicated on unpreserved challenges to identification). Cf. Lopez,
886 P.2d at 1113-14 (failure to challenge eyewitness identifications below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal). For this reason, the reliability of the identification
evidence must be presumed. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, f 30.
22

Specific references to the record are contained in the State's Statement of Facts,
supra, at 4-10. A comparison of the State's Statement of Facts and defendant's also
demonstrates that defendant has failed to properly marshal all the evidence and inferences
in favor of the jury verdict. This failure provides another ground for refusing to consider
the merits of his appeal. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,141,370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11;
Vessey, 967 P.2d at 966.
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4. When the robber left he appeared headed to the Hilton Hotel, about a block
away.
5. The robber hid the gun used in the robbery in a trash can in a bathroom directly
across from Annabella's Restaurant, inside the Hilton Hotel.

6. The robber entered Annabella's Restaurant wearing a gray sweater.
7. The robber left his gray sweater behind when he left Annabella's.
8. Defendant was detained at the Hilton Hotel shortly after the robbery and while,
according to Ms. Dent and defense counsel, the robber was in the hotel.
9. When he was stopped by the police, defendant was at the closest public
telephone to Annabelle's and the bathroom where the gun was found.
10. Defendant's height, weight, sex, age, skin color, hair color, and hair length
were consistent with those of the robber's.
11. Defendant's baggy blue pants were consistent with those of the robber and
those of the man observed walking away from the Deseret Inn and towards the
Hilton.
12. Defendant had $850.00 in cash hidden in his shoes, the same amount taken in
the robbery.
Additionally, the following evidence, though contested, established that:
13. Ms. Dent identified defendant as the person who wore the gray sweater into
the restaurant and left it there. While defendant contested that he was the one who
had left the sweater, he did not contest that the sweater was the robber's.
14. Without a sweater or coat, defendant was dressed unreasonably for the cold
winter weather.
15. Defendant wore a metal hoop earring in each of his ears which earrings were,
according to Mr. Davis, similar to the ones worn by the robber.
16. Defendant's hair color and length were the same as the robber. While the
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hairstyle differed, defendant's hair was wet when stopped by the police from
which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant washed or rinsed his hair in
the hotel's bathroom at the same time that he hid the gun in the trash.
17. Defendant gave conflicting accounts of who he was going to meet. He told
one officer he was meeting a male friend. He told another officer that he was
meeting a female friend. And he told Ms. Dent in the restaurant that he was alone.
Andfinally,having viewed the robber in good light, at close range, and with an
unobstructed view, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782; Rivera, 954 P.2d at 227,
18. Mr. Davis made a "less than 100 per cent" identification of defendant an hour
after the robbery based on changes in defendant's appearance, which changes
could reasonably be accounted for: defendant rinsed or washed his hair, got rid of
his sweater, and put on glasses before being stopped by the police.
19. Mr. Davis positively identified defendant as the robber during a line-up.
20. Mr. Davis had "no doubt" at trial that defendant was the robber.
Given the totality of this evidence, the jury acted reasonably in convicting
defendant. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,ffl[42-27, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11; Lopez, 886 P.2d at
1112 (tentative initial identification did not negate subsequent positive in-court
identification; evidence sufficient to convict); Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362 (discrepancies
between physical characteristics of described assailant and defendant went to credibility
and were "best left" to the jury); Baker, 963 P.2d at 809 (inconsistent, confused
testimony coupled with failure to identify defendant in a line-up did not render evidence
insufficient for conviction).
CONCLUSION
Based on defendant's failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence
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below, this Court should refuse to consider the claim for the first time on appeal.
Alternatively, to the extent defendant's closing argument may preserve a general
challenge to the reasonableness of the verdict, the evidence provided a reasonable basis
for defendant's conviction. This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for
aggravated robbery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ ^ j d a y of January, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney GelieTaTX

^CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-6-302

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediateflightafter the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 17

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absencefromthe trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the casefrombeing tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendantfromtrial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.

Rule 17
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(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any
number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in
the following order
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has
rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the
count, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument.
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each
party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate
juror If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new trial ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received
as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any
notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken
by any other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their .deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
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defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and
the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 23

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At anv time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
i n L ' e m S o?r P onmotionofadefendantshalla^
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of heoffense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a oomnatment until the
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be
just and proper under the circumstances.

Rule 24
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Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.

Rule 50
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itsshould be used, but the court should take
adv&r^age of special verdicts when specific issues cahnot otherwise be reached. Baker v.
Cook. 6 UtahvW 161, 308 P.2d 264 (1957).
There is no impropriety in submitting special
interrogatories if th^court so desires. Hanks v.
Christensen. 11 Utah^tfsk 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
Trial court did not err Ihsgubmitting special
interrogatories instead of a general verdict as
requested by plaintiff. This rule sahefcions sug
COL
Utah Law Review. — RecepfDevelopments
in Utah Law. 1980 Utah LJRev. 649.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B AnKVur. 2d Trial 1835 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C J ^ T r i a l §§ 526 to 573.
A.L.R. — Submission of special interrogatories in connection with general verdict under
Federal Rule 49(b), and state counterparts, 6
A.L.R.3d^38.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Competency of juror's statement or affidavit
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procedure. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15
Utah 2d 257, 391 P2d280 (1964).
Where jury answers to special interrogatories submitted on all disputed material issues
are adversetarlhe defendant, the court properly
entered Urffgment for the plaintiff. S & F Supply Gafv. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974).
Cited in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591
(Utah 1982).
, REFERENCES
show that verdict in civil case was not
correctly reported, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132.
Validity of verdict or verdicts by same jury in
personal iimiry action awarding damages to
injured spou&eJbut denying recovery to other
spouse seekingScollateral damages, or vice
versa, 66 A.L.R.3cT4^2.
' Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts
on separate theories of negligence, breach of
warranty, or strict liability, 4PA.L.R.4th 9.

Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect A party who moves for a
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
Amotion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without
any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for
a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within
ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may
be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative.
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed: If no verdict was
returned the court may direct the entry ofjudgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for in
Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion
for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the
judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for
granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is
thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the
judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted
and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the

131

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 50

appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that
denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
(d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent,
assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, orfromdirecting the trial court to determine whether
a new trial shall be granted.
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Rule 59

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of
{ 1004 et seq.
judgment against one joint tort-feasor as reC J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments <§§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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Rule 29

R u l e 29. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
(a) Motion Before Submission to Jury. Motions
for directed verdict are abolished and motions for
judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own
motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal
of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or
information after the evidence on either side is closed
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of
such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence
offered by the government is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the
right
(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. The
court may reserve decision on a motion for judgment
of acquittal, proceed with the trial (where the motion
is made before the close of all the evidence), submit
the case to the jury and decide the motion either
before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict If the court reserves decision, it
must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at
the time the ruling was reserved.
(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury
returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without
having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of
acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after
the jury is discharged or within such further time as
the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a
verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such
motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of
acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may
enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary
to the making of such a motion that a similar motion
has been made prior to the submission of the case to
the jury.
(d) Same: Conditional Ruling on Grant of Motion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal after
verdict of guilty under this Rule is granted, the court
shall also determine whether any motion for a new
trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is
thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the grounds
for such determination. If the motion for a new trial
is granted conditionally, the order thereon does not
affect the finality of the judgment If the motion for a
new trial has been granted conditionally and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed
unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. If
such motion has been denied conditionally, the appellee on appeal may assert error in that denial, and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the
appellate court
(As amended Feb. 28,1966, eff. July 1,1966; Nov. 10,1986,
Pub.L. 99-646, § 54(a), 100 Stat 3607; Apr. 29, 1994, eff.
Dec. 1,1994.)

Addendum B

1

WITH $850.00 IN HIS SHOES.

2

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THERE SIMPLY IS NO

3

OTHER EXPLANATION.

WE CAN, IN LIFE, ACCEPT A LOT

4

OF FOIBLES OF HUMAN BEINGS, WE DON'T ALWAYS

5

REMEMBER.

6

WHEN WE GET FRIGHTENED, THERE'S UNSURITIES, THERE

7

IS THINGS THAT POLICE DO.

8

WE BREAK DOWN AS HUMAN BEINGS.

9

TO STRETCH OUR IMAGINATIONS TO FIND A WAY THAT IS

FOR SURE THERE'S THINGS THAT HAPPENED

THERE IS A LOT OF TIME
WE ARE NOT EXPECTED

10

EVEN CLOSE TO REASONABLE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT

11

GUILTY.

12

PEOPLE TO LOOK AND JUDGE THE FACTS.

13

WE EXPECT AND RELY ON YOU AS REASONABLE

IF ONE LOOKS AT THESE REASONABLY THERE IS

14

SIMPLY NO OTHER EXPLANATION THAT ALL OF THESE

15

EVENTS COULD HAVE COME TOGETHER, THERE IS SIMPLY NO

16

WAY FOR SOMEONE THAT LOOKS LIKE THE DEFENDANT, TO

17

BE IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, DOING THOSE THINGS, WITH

18

EVERYTHING ELSE, WITH THAT MONEY IN HIS POCKET.

19

THAT IS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND THAT IS WHY

20

HE IS GUILTY.

21

YOU.

22

I ASK YOU TO FIND HIM SO.

MR. O'CONNELLt

THANK

YOUR HONOR, I'D LIKE TO

23

BRING THE BOARD OVER.

IF IT PLEASE THE COURT,

24

COUNSEL, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY.

25

LIKE TO USE THE BOARD HERE, AND THE JUDGE KNOWS

I'D

1

THAT.

THAT IS MY SYMBOL PROM MY LAST ONE.

2

THING I WANTED TO START OUT RIGHT AWAY, AND I

3

THINK THERE'S AN INSTRUCTION ON IT, WHAT WE SAY

4

IN ARGUMENT IS NOT EVIDENCE.

5

TO MAKE SURE THAT WHAT WE SAY IS NOT WHAT THE

6

FACTS ARE.

7

OKAY?

ONE

I WANT YOU

IT'S WHAT YOU REMEMBER THE FACTS ARE.
THE REASON I SAY THAT IS I'VE HEARD

8

MR. PARKER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

AND I DISAGREE

9

TOTALLY ON SOME OF THE FACTS AS HE HAS LISTED.

10

IN FACT, AS I RECALL THE EVIDENCE, THEY WERE

11

COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.

12

GO BACK TO YOUR RECOLLECTION AND REMEMBER THAT.

13

I WILL GO THROUGH AND PICK OUT THE ONES WHERE I

14

THINK HE HAS A DIFFERENCE.

15

AND THAT IS UP TO YOU TO

NOW, THIS IS AN I.D. CASE.

I DISAGREE

16

WITH THE STATE.

17

THE OTHER EVIDENCE MAY COME AROUND TO SUPPORT

18

THAT I.D. OR TAKE AWAY FROM THAT I.D., BUT

19

TOTALLY I.D. CASES, OR ONE PERSON AT ALL WAS ABLE

20

TO TESTIFY OR, IN THIS CASE, ANY IDENTIFICATION

21

AT ALL, AND THAT WAS GREG DAVIS.

22

ONLY 5 0 PERCENT LIKELY.

23

IT IS TOTALLY AN I.D. CASE.

NOW

AND THAT WAS

NOW WHAT'S IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE IS TO

24

REMEMBER THAT THIS ROBBERY TOOK PLACE REALLY

25

QUICKLY.

IT WAS TWO TO THREE MINUTES.

MOST OF

1

THE TIME MR. DAVIS IS LOOKING AT, FIRST HE'S

2

LOOKING AT THE GUY'S POCKETS.

3

SAYS, HE WAS WATCHING THE GUY'S POCKETS AS HE

4

WALKED IN BECAUSE HE THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS

5

STRANGE.

6

WHEN HE CAME UP HE PULLED OUT THE GUN, WHICH HE

7

WAS HOLDING DOWN LOW.

8

IS GOING TO DO, YOU ARE GOING TO KEEP AN EYE ON

9

AND SEE WHERE THAT GUN WAS POINTED, IF IT WAS

YOU REMEMBER HE

HE WAS KEEPING AN EYE ON HIS POCKETS.

AND ANY REASONABLE PERSON

10

POINTED ON YOU.

HE SAID HE TRIED TO KEEP MOVING.

11

HE HAD TO GO OPEN THE REGISTER, WHICH REQUIRES

12

ATTENTION, OPEN IT UP, AND THEN HE WENT BACK TO

13

THE BACK ROOM.

14

SO THE MOMENT HE HAD TO LOOK AT THE

15

DEFENDANT WAS QUITE SHORT, WHICH WAS PROBABLY

16

EVEN LESS THAN TWO MINUTES, BECAUSE MOST OF HIS

17

TIME HIS ATTENTION IS NOT GOING TO BE AT THE

18

ROBBER'S FACE.

19

THE REASON THAT'S IMPORTANT IS THAT

20

WHAT'S MORE LIKELY TO BE CORRECT?

WHEN YOU ONLY

21

HAVE A FEW MINUTES TO LOOK AT SOMEBODY, WHEN IS

22

YOUR IDENTIFICATION GOING TO BE MOST ACCURATE?

23

AND THAT IS WHEN?

24

BECAUSE WHEN TIMES GOES BY YOUR MEMORY IS GOING

25

TO CHANGE, YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF

THE SOONEST AFTER THE ROBBERY,

1

HAVING SEEN THE DEFENDANT FOR LONGER PERIODS OF

2

TIME OR SEEN MR. RUDOLPH FOR LONGER PERIODS OF

3

TIME, AND THIS IS GOING TO CLOUD YOUR JUDGMENT.

4

SO WHAT WE WANT TO LOOK AT IS

5

IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE WITHIN AN HOUR AFTER THE

6

ROBBERY.

7

WHEN HE'S MOST LIKELY TO MAKE AN ACCURATE

8

IDENTIFICATION.

9

ONLY 50 PERCENT SURE.

THAT'S WHEN IT'S FRESHEST IN HIS MIND,

AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID HE WAS
WHY IS HE 50 PERCENT SURE?

10

BECAUSE MY CLIENT IS PRETTY AVERAGE.

11

AVERAGE.

12

AVERAGE BUILD.

13

IT BEST, WOULD BE LIKE THE BOY NEXT DOOR.

14

THE PROBLEM WITH THIS CASE, WE HAVE AN AVERAGE

15

PERSON WHO GOES IN THERE AND ROBS A STORE.

16

HE'S PRETTY

AVERAGE HEIGHT, AVERAGE HAIR COLOR,
THE ROBBER, I THINK MS. DENT PUT
THAT'S

NOW MR. PARKER SAYS, I RULED OUT A

17

WHOLE BUNCH OF PEOPLE.

THAT IS A HUGE GROUP OF

18

PEOPLE.

19

MEN WITH SHORT BROWN HAIR.

20

COURTROOM ALONE, I HAVE SHORT BROWN HAIR,

21

MR. PARKER HAS SHORT BROWN HAIR, MR. RUDOLPH HAS

22

SHORT BROWN HAIR.

23

CASE.

24

NEXT DOOR, HE GOES IN THERE AND GRABS SOMEBODY

25

ELSE WHO IS AVERAGE.

THAT TAKES A HUGE GROUP OF PEOPLE, YOUNG
JUST IN THIS

IT'S COMMON.

IT'S COMMON

SO WE TAKE SOMEBODY WHO IS THE AVERAGE BOY

THAT'S WHY HE'S 50 PERCENT

1

SURE BECAUSE THEY'RE BOTH AVERAGE.

2

NOW THE STATE SAYS THE REASON WHY HE'S

3

ONLY 50 PERCENT SURE IS BECAUSE HE CHANGED HIS

4

APPEARANCE.

5

CHANGES, THESE ARE DIFFERENCES.

6

TRYING TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE CHANGE IN HIS

7
8

t

APPEARANCE.

I WANT TO TELL YOU IT IS NOT
THE STATE'S JUST

THESE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE

ACTUAL ROBBER AND MY CLIENT.

9

ONE.

I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT IS HIS

10

GLASSES.

11

CAME INTO THE STORE, NO GLASSES.

MY CLIENT HAD

12

GLASSES ON WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED.

HE WAS WITH A

13

POLICE OFFICER WHO TESTIFIED HE HAD GLASSES ON,

14

WHEN THEY PUT HIM IN THE ROOM HE HAD GLASSES ON.

15

NOW, THAT'S CRUCIAL.

16

BECAUSE -- WHEN HE ROBBED THE PLACE HE WASN'T

17

WEARING HIS GLASS.

18

HAVE TAKEN OFF HIS GLASSES FOR THE ROBBERY?

19

THE ROBBER DID NOT HAVE GLASSES ON.

TWO.

NOW THE STATE'S SAYING

WHY?

WHY WOULD THE ROBBER

WHERE DID HE PUT THEM?

HE ONLY

20

HAD LEVI'S AND A SWEATER ON.

21

ANYBODY WEARS GLASSES THEY ARE NOT GOING TO PUT

22

THEM IN A POCKET BECAUSE THEY'RE GOING TO GET

23

CRUSHED, UNLESS THE ROBBER THOUGHT HE WAS GOING

24

TO DO A SUPERMAN DEFENSE.

25

HIS.

HE'S SUPERMAN.

SUPPOSEDLY, IF

CLARK KENT TAKES OFF

OBVIOUSLY, THIS ROBBER

1

DIDN'T WEAR A MASK DISGUISE AND TAKE OFF HIS

2

GLASSES IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE PEOPLE.

3

GLASSES ON.

4

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY CLIENT AND THEIR CLIENT.

5

THAT'S HUGE.

TWO.

HE HAS

THAT IS A BIG

THE COLOGNE.

THE ROBBER HAD

6

COLOGNE.

AND AGAIN I WANT YOU TO LOOK BACK.

I

7

MEAN, HE TESTIFIES, HE IS KIND OF WAFFLING, KINDA

8

MAKES IT SOUND LIKE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN COLOGNE,

9

JUST STRONG MOUSSE, BUT WHEN AGAIN, BACK WHEN HE

10

WAS AT THE SCENE, HE TOLD THE OFFICER THAT THE

11

ROBBER SMELLED OF COLOGNE.

12

WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED, AND I DON'T KNOW IF THE

13

OFFICERS TESTIFIED THAT THE WITNESS SAID HE HAD

14

COLOGNE, OR HE SMELLED MY CLIENT, BUT IN HIS

15

STATEMENT THAT GUY DID NOT SMELL OF COLOGNE.

16

TURTLENECK.

AND THAT MY CLIENT,

MR. MC CANN SAID BACK THEN

17

HE THOUGHT THE INDIVIDUAL HAD A TURTLENECK ON.

18

NOW HE SAYS HE IS NOT SO SURE.

19

TIME HAS GONE PAST, NOW HE SEES THEY HAVE A

20

T-SHIRT AND NOT A TURTLENECK.

21

GOING TO START SAYING, WELL, MAYBE I AM NOT SO

22

SURE.

23

WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS, BUT BACK THEN HE SAID THE

24

ROBBER HAD A TURTLENECK.

25

THAT'S BECAUSE

OF COURSE HE'S

HE'S GOING TO CHANGE HIS TESTIMONY TO FIT

THE EARRINGS.

NOW I ASKED THE GANG

1

TASK OFFICER, AND I'M GLAD HE WAS HERE, BECAUSE

2

HE TESTIFIED THAT IT'S NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE YOUTH

3

OF UTAH, ESPECIALLY THE ONES HE DEALS WITH

4

DOWNTOWN, TO BE WEARING BAGGY LEVI'S.

5

COMMON.

6

WEARING EARRINGS.

7

EARRINGS ON DOESN'T REALLY MEAN MUCH, BUT THIS IS

8

WHERE I DISAGREE WITH WHAT THE WITNESS SAID.

9

THAT'S

IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THEM TO BE
JUST THE FACT THAT HE HAD

HE SAID -- HE DIDN'T SAY HE DOESN'T

10

REMEMBER WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY

11

HE SAID ON THE STAND HE REMEMBERS THEM BEING

12

PLAIN.

13

EARRINGS THEY AREN'T PLAIN.

14

WEDDING BANDS.

15

LOOKING EARRINGS ON THE ROBBER.

16

TOLD THE POLICE THAT THEY WERE GOLD, AND AT

17

ANOTHER HEARING PRIOR TO THIS WHEN HE TESTIFIED

18

ON THE STAND UNDER OATH, AGAIN HE SAID THAT THE

19

EARRINGS WERE GOLD.

20

BEEN GOLD OR SILVER.

21

PLAIN EARRINGS.

ORNAMENTATION,

IF YOU LOOK AT THOSE
THEY LOOK LIKE

SO WE HAVE PLAIN, FAIRLY THICK
HE ALSO SAID,

TODAY HE SAYS THEY MAY HAVE

NOW THAT KINDA DEMONSTRATES A PROBLEM

22

WITH THE STATE'S CASE AND THEIR PROBLEM WITH

23

MEMORY IN GENERAL.

24

INCIDENT, HE IS SURE THEY'RE GOLD, BUT

25

AFTERWARDS, AFTER BEING MORE INVOLVED IN THE

BACK THEN, RIGHT AFTER THE

1

CASE, FINDING OUT THAT THE EARRINGS ON THE

2

DEFENDANT AREN•T GOLD, HE STARTS CHANGING HIS

3

TESTIMONY, CHANGING IT JUST ENOUGH THAT IT STARTS

4

FITTING.

5

GOLD OR SILVER.

6

HELPFUL.

7

HE WANTED TO MAKE THE CASE BETTER SO HE'S NOT

8

SWITCHING TO GOLD OR SILVER.

9

THEY WERE GOLD.

10

NOW HE IS NOT SURE, THOUGH, IF THEY'RE
THAT IS BECAUSE HE WANTS TO BE

I DON'T THINK HE'S LYING, BUT I THINK

BACK THEN HE SAID

THE STATE ALSO TALKS ABOUT OTHER

11

THINGS.

12

SWEATER WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED.

13

MAKES A DEAL OUT OF THE FACT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED

14

HE WASN'T WEARING A COAT OR SWEATER.

15

COLD OUT IN JANUARY.

16

WASN'T ARRESTED OUTSIDE, HE WAS ARRESTED INSIDE.

17

SO IT WASN'T SURPRISING HE WASN'T WEARING HIS'

18

COAT AT THE TIME.

19

HIM IF THIS WAS YOUR SWEATER, HE TOLD HIM NO, I

20

HAD A COAT.

21

DIDN'T HAVE 'EM ON HIM.

22

AGAIN IS GOING TO POINT OUT WHERE THE FACT ONE OF

23

THE OTHER OFFICERS ASKED HIM, IT'S COLD OUTSIDE,

24

AND MY CLIENT SAID HE DID HAVE A COAT.

25

HE WASN'T WEARING A SWEATER.

NO GRAY

NOW THE STATE

AND IT WAS

I SHOULD POINT OUT HE

WHEN THE GANG TASK FORCE ASKED

SO HE DID HAVE A COAT.

HE JUST

AND I'M SURE THE STATE

BUT I WANT TO MAKE ANOTHER POINT.

ALL

1

THE STATEMENT'S MY CLIENT MADE, THE POLICE

2

RELAYED TO YOU, ARE JUST SHORT, ONE BIT

3

STATEMENTS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.

4

ASKED HIM, ARE YOU WEARING A COAT, NO, I'M NOT.

5

HE WASN'T WEARING A COAT.

6

UP AND GOES, IS THIS YOUR SWEATER?

7

YEAH, I HAD A COAT.

8

THE ONE STATEMENT IS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.

9

DID HAVE A COAT ON AT THE TIME.

THE OFFICER

ANOTHER OFFICER COMES
HE SAYS,

THEY'RE NOT INCONSISTENT.
HE

AND THAT'S

10

PROBABLY WHAT HE WAS ANSWERING TO THE OFFICER.

11

THE OTHER OFFICER EXPLAINS HE HAS A COAT.

12

IF THEY LOOKED AROUND, LOOKED AROUND THE HOTEL,

13

LOOKED IN LOST AND FOUND WHERE IT PROBABLY IS

14

NOW, THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND MY CLIENT'S COAT.

15

CHANGES.

I BET

THE STATE AGAIN MAKES A BIG

16

DEAL WITH THE FACT MY CLIENT ALLEGEDLY CHANGED

17

HIS APPEARANCE.

18

WASHED.

19

ACTUALLY, IN SOME WAYS, IS A BAD FACT FOR US, BUT

20

I THINK IT KINDA SHOWS YOU WHERE THE STATE'S

21

WRONG HERE.

22

HIS HAIR, MY CLIENT'S HAIR, LOOKED WET AND KINDA

23

SPIKY.

24

DOES GREG DAVIS SAY HIS HAIR LOOKED LIKE?

25

WET AND SPIKY.

THEY SAY HE LOOKED LIKE HE WAS

BECAUSE HIS HAIR WAS WET.

NOW THIS

IF YOU WILL RECALL, OFFICERS SAID

AND IF YOU GO BACK TO THE ROBBERY, WHAT
KINDA

1

NOW I SAY THAT IS A BAD BREAK FOR US

2

BECAUSE IT SEEMS LIKE A SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE

3

TWO OF THEM, BUT I THINK THAT'S COMMON WHERE MOST

4

YOUTH, INDIVIDUALS TODAY, PUT MOUSSE IN THEIR

5

HAIR, WEAR IT SHORT, AND WEAR IT SPIKY.

6

THE STATE GOES, HIS HAIR WAS WET SO HE WAS

7

OBVIOUSLY CHANGING HIS APPEARANCE, TRYING TO MAKE

8

HIMSELF LOOK DIFFERENT, BUT HE DIDN'T LOOK

9

DIFFERENT.

AT LEAST HIS HAIR DIDN'T LOOK

10

DIFFERENT.

BUT REMEMBER WHEN GREG DAVIS GOES IN

11

AND SEES HIM?

12

BUT HE CAN'T IDENTIFY HIM.

13

DIDN'T DO ANYTHING TO CHANGE HIS APPEARANCE,

14

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN HIM AND THE ROBBER, BUT HE

15

WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HIM.

16

WELL,

HE KNOWS HIS HAIR IS DIFFERENT,
HE HAS MY CLIENT,

NOW I WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE MONEY,

17

BECAUSE THE STATE MAKES AN ISSUE ABOUT THE MONEY.

18

IT IS, AGAIN, WHERE I DISAGREE WITH THEM.

19

SAY APPROXIMATELY 800.00 TO $850.00 WAS TAKEN.

20

WE DON'T KNOW THAT.

21

WAS TAKEN.

22

DECIDED HOW MUCH MONEY NEVER CAME AND TESTIFIED

23

TODAY AND TOLD US HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN.

24

AGAIN WE ARE RELYING ON GREG DAVIS' MEMORY OVER A

25

YEAR LATER, AFTER HE'S PROBABLY FOUND OUT WHAT

THEY

WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY

THE PERSON WHO ACTUALLY COUNTED AND

1

THE FACTS WERE, HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN FROM THE

2

ROBBERY.

3

$80 0.0 0 WAS TAKEN.

4

MONEY WAS TAKEN.

5

CASE AND HE'S APPROXIMATING HOW MUCH MONEY WAS

6

TAKEN.

7

$400.00 IN THERE, BECAUSE THERE'S ALWAYS $400.00

8

IN THE TILL.

9

THEY HAD 8 5 0.00 WAS TAKEN.

AND NOW HE APPROXIMATES THAT ABOUT
HE DOESN'T KNOW HOW MUCH
HE JUST KNOWS THE FACTS OF THIS

FOR ALL WE KNOW THERE MAY HAVE BEEN

THAT'S IT.

SO IT ISN'T COINCIDENCE
HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW

10

MUCH WAS TAKEN, WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH WAS TAKEN,

11

THE STATE HASN'T SHOWN US HOW MUCH MONEY WAS

12

TAKEN.

IT'S SOMETHING THAT WAS UNKNOWN.

13

OKAY?

I JUST WANT TO POINT OUT OTHER THINGS

14

ABOUT MR. DAVIS.

THE FACT THAT, YOU KNOW, HE

15

COULD GET THE MONEY WRONG.

16

OF WHERE HE WORKS WRONG.

17

WORKS AT THIS PLACE AND HE THINKS IT IS 500 SOUTH

18

200 WEST.

19

HIM, AND ISN'T IT REALLY 50 WEST, THAT HE CHANGED

20

IT.

21

EXACTLY SURE WHAT THE TIME WAS.

22

BEEN 6:00 OR 7:00.

23

TIME AGO AND HE CAN'T ALWAYS REMEMBER ALL THE

24

DETAILS AND HE DIDN'T COUNT THE MONEY SO WE DON'T

25

KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN.

HE GETS THE ADDRESS
OKAY?

A YEAR AGO HE

IT WASN'T UNTIL MR. PARKER CORRECTS

HE GETS THE ADDRESS WRONG.

HE IS NOT
IT MIGHT HAVE

HE ADMITS TO IT BEING A LONG

1

AGAIN, I WANT TO TALK A LITTLE BIT

2

ABOUT THE STATEMENT BECAUSE MR. PARKER SAYS MY

3

CLIENT MADE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

4

HEARD JUST ONE SHORT PHRASE FROM SEVERAL

5

DIFFERENT OFFICERS AND THEY WERE COMPLETELY TAKEN

6

OUT OF CONTEXT.

7

WAS, WHAT OTHER STATEMENTS WERE MADE, WE DON'T

8

KNOW WHAT THE WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS.

9

STATEMENTS BY THEMSELVES MAY LOOK INCONSISTENT.

AGAIN, WE

WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE CONTEXT

THESE

10

HE WAS THERE TO MEET HIS FRIEND, HE WAS THERE TO

11

MEET HIS GIRLFRIEND, HE WAS THERE TO MEET BOTH OF

12

THEM.

13

HE TOLD HE WAS MEETING HIS FRIEND.

14

HE BROUGHT UP.

15

GOING TO MEET HIS GIRLFRIEND.

16

HE JUST TOLD TWO DIFFERENT OFFICERS.

ONE

THAT IS WHAT

AND THE OTHER HE TOLD HE WAS

AGAIN, ABOUT THE COAT, HE TELLS ONE

17

OFFICER AT ONE POINT HE WAS WEARING A COAT AND

18

ANOTHER TIME HE WAS WEARING A COAT.

19

STATEMENTS ARE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.

20

THE WHOLE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATION, HOW IT

21

ALL WENT, THEY WOULDN'T LOOK INCONSISTENT.

22

AGAIN, THESE
IF WE KNEW

I WANTED TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT

23

REASONABLE DOUBT.

NOW THE VERY EXPERIENCED DEFENSE

24

ATTORNEY ONCE DEMONSTRATED REASONABLE DOUBT AND DID

25

THE BEST JOB OF TRYING TO EXPLAIN, BECAUSE IT IS

1

NOT EASY.

WHAT'S BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

WE

2

KNOW IT IS THE HIGHEST STANDARD IN THE CRIMINAL,

3

NOT EVEN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, IN THE

4

JUSTICE SYSTEM ALL TOGETHER.

5

STANDARD.

6

THERE ARE WAYS TO SHOW IT, EXPLAIN IT, AND I

7

THOUGHT MAYBE YOU CAN BETTER VISUALIZE IT, IS

8

LOOKING AT THE SCALES OF JUSTICE.

9

SCALES BALANCED EVENLY.

IT IS A HIGHEST

WHAT DOES REASONABLE DOUBT MEAN?

NOW

WE HAVE THESE

YOU ALWAYS SEE 'EM ON THE

10

COURTHOUSE, THE WOMAN HOLDING THE SALES OF JUSTICE.

11

NOW THE SCALES DON'T START OUT EVENLY, OKAY, LIKE

12

MOST SCALES DO.

13

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

14

TO BE INNOCENT SO THE SCALES ARE TIPPED ALL THE WAY

15

IN HIS FAVOR.

16

TO EVEN THEM, TO MAKE IT 50 PERCENT THAT HE'S

17

GUILTY.

18

IS NOT ENOUGH TO TIP THE SCALES TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

19

THAT'S PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

20

CIVIL STANDARD.

21

AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, WHICH IS ANOTHER CIVIL

22

STANDARD.

23

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

24

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ALL THE WAY TO BEYOND A

25

REASONABLE DOUBT.

THAT IS BECAUSE THERE IS A
MR. RUDOLPH IS PRESUMED

AND IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE STATE

IF THAT'S THE CASE, HE IS NOT GUILTY, IT

THAT IS A

IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO GO TO CLEAR

YOU HAVE TO TIP THE SCALE ALL THE WAY TO
SO THE SCALE GOES FROM

ALL THE DEFENDANT HAS TO DO IS

1

TIP THE SCALE TO, BACK TO BELOW BEYOND A REASONABLE

2

DOUBT.

NOT MUCH OF A STANDARD.

3

NOW WHY IS THERE REASONABLE DOUBT IN THIS

4

CASE?

I THINK I'VE GONE THROUGH GENERALLY, BUT

5

I'LL TELL YOU WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE.

6

AN AVERAGE LOOKING INDIVIDUAL, YOUNG MAN, SHORT

7

BROWN HAIR, AVERAGE BUILD, AVERAGE HEIGHT, GOES IN

8

THE DESERET INN.

9

THE CASH, HE RUNS DOWN PROBABLY TO THE HILTON

WE HAVE

HE HOLDS THE PLACE UP, HE TAKES

10

HOTEL, EVEN THOUGH WE DON'T KNOW THAT FOR SURE,

11

BECAUSE NO ONE SAW HIM GO IN THERE.

12

HILTON HOTEL, GOES DOWN, SITS IN THE RESTAURANT.

13

HE'S SITTING THERE.

14

SEES SOME COMMOTION BECAUSE ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL IS

15

BEING ARRESTED.

16

THINKS HE'S GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT, HE THINKS HE'S

17

OKAY.

18

HE SEES SOME COMMOTION GOING ON.

HE GOES IN THE

WHILE HE'S SITTING THERE HE

HE GOES, UH-OH.

FIRST OF ALL, HE

SO HE GOES TO THE HOTEL; HE SITS DOWN.

19

NOW

NOW REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THERE

20

WAS POLICE RESPONDING REALLY QUICKLY.

IF THEY GET

21

A CALL THEY ARE AT THE HILTON HOTEL WITHIN FIVE

22

MINUTES.

23

INDIVIDUAL.

24

HAPPENING, ALTHOUGH NOW THE POLICE ARE NEARER IN

25

THE HOTEL.

SO THEY COME IN, THEY ARREST THIS
HE IS SITTING THERE.

HE SEES THIS

I'M IN TROUBLE, SO HE DITCHES THE

1

SWEATER.

2

DITCHES THE GUN THERE, THEN HE SPLITS OUT WHILE

3

THEY HAVE MY CLIENT IN CUSTODY.

4

HE GOES ACROSS TO THE RESTROOM, HE

MY CLIENT IS DOWN THERE TO MEET HIS

5

GIRLFRIEND AND HIS FRIEND, HE'S PLANNING TO HAVE A

6

GOOD NIGHT OUT.

7

IS THE BAY, IS NEARBY, THERE'S OTHER BARS AROUND.

8

AND HE BRINGS HIS MONEY.

9

OCCASION, WHEN I'M WORRIED ABOUT BEING ROBBED, HE

THERE IS A RESTAURANT THERE, THERE

AND AS I'VE DONE ON

10

PUT HIS MONEY IN HIS SHOE.

WHEN I WAS BACK IN

11

COLLEGE, BEFORE I HAD CREDIT CARDS, I USED TO CARRY

12

QUITE A BIT OF CASK ON ME.

13

CARRY IT BECAUSE I WOULD BE VERY PARANOID.

14

TO GO TO SCHOOL IN NEW YORK SO IT'S A DIFFERENT

15

FACTOR, BUT I ALWAYS CARRIED IT IN MY SHOE AS WELL.

16

THAT'S NOT TOO SURPRISING.

17

CREDIT CARDS YOU RELY ON CASH.

18

OUT AT NIGHT, YOU ARE GOING TO BRING A LOT OF MONEY

19

WITH YOU.

20

LOBBY, HE IS ON THE PHONE, THE POLICE COME UP AND

21

GRAB HIM.

22

I WOULD ASK YOU TO FIND MY CLIENT NOT GUILTY.

THAT'S WHERE I WOULD
I USED

AND WHEN YOU DON'T HAVE
YOU ARE GOING TO GO

HE IS AN AVERAGE BUILD, HE IS OUT IN THE

THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PARKER:

25

IS ADDRESS A COUPLE OF THINGS.

AND

MR. PARKER?
I GUESS WHAT I WANT TO DO
AND I DON'T WANT

